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Mickey implemented the Stable Mariage Mechanism in Z-Tree, which was quite tricky.Abstract
We investigate experimentally if endogenous partnership formation can improve
e¢ ciency in social dilemma situations. Subjects play multiple two-player public
goods games, where they can break up with their current partner after every fourth
game. Subjects without a partner provide rankings of the available other singles
regarding their preferred subject to be matched with. A stable marriage mechanism
determines the new matches. We vary the information subjects have when they
express their preferences for their future matches and also if staying in a partnership
leads to a cost or a bonus. We ￿nd that endogenous group formation can increase
e¢ ciency. Both the provision of contribution history at the time of re-matching and
bonuses for staying in a partnership have positive e⁄ects. At least one of the two
positive factors has to be present for an e¢ ciency improvement. The presence of
both leads to the best results.
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￿email: ralph.bayer@adelaide.edu.au￿It is rare to ￿nd a business partner who is sel￿ess. If you are lucky it
happens once in a lifetime.￿Michael Eisner, CEO of The Walt Disney
Company
1 Introduction
Many real-world situations have the structure of social dilemmas. In social dilemmas
individual incentives prevent rational and purely self-interested group members from
achieving a socially optimal allocation. The underlying driving force are externalities
that are not internalised. For example, the hard work of a member of a team may
bene￿t all team members while the e⁄ort cost is borne privately. The bene￿t of
catching a ￿sh accrues privately, while all local ￿shermen bear the cost of reduced
stock. The cleaning e⁄ort of a family member makes for a nicer home for the whole
family but only the cleaner￿ s back hurts. Traditionally, economists have sought after
mechanisms, incentive contracts and government intervention that can overcome
these problems. Examples are the Clarke-Groves mechanism, performance based
bonus contracts or the public provision of public goods ￿nanced by taxes. Moreover,
Folk theorems show that in in￿nitely repeated games equilibria exist where players
cooperate. Our question here is if partnerships can help achieve e¢ ciency, when
mechanisms, contracts, the government and in￿nite time horizons are absent.
Experimental studies have shown that under certain circumstances humans can
overcome free-riding incentives in social dilemma situations. Typically, humans are
able to cooperate to some extent and sustain cooperation for some time in ￿nitely
repeated social dilemma situations (e.g. public goods games). Initial cooperation
erodes over time though (Ledyard 1995). Some institutional arrangements, such
as the availability of costly punishment, have been shown to prevent cooperation
from decaying (Fehr and G￿chter 2000). Punishment works better when the group
composition is ￿xed than when groups are reformed randomly after each period. The
evidence is mixed on whether partners or strangers cooperate more if punishment
opportunities are absent (Andreoni and Croson 2008).
This paper explores if endogenous partnership formation, where partnerships
can be broken and matches can be in￿ uenced by subjects, has the capability of
improving cooperation. Our interest in this question is motivated by both applied
and more fundamental methodological questions. Firstly, working partnerships are
generally seen as something very desirable. This is true in the business world ￿
as our leading quote shows ￿but also in the private sphere. Just think of a good
marriage. Moreover, working partnerships with coauthors play an important role
in our academic lives.1 In this article we want to tackle some questions related to
partnerships. What makes a good partnership? Is a long-lasting, stable partnership
necessarily more e¢ cient? What role does reputation play when partnership forma-
tion is endogenous? And ￿nally, how do the speci￿cs of partnership situations such
as breakup and maintenance costs in￿ uence partnership formation and e¢ ciency?
Parnerships arise from mutual agreement and can be broken by an individual
(potentially by incurring a cost). Hence, partnership formation in real life is en-
1It is only due to a coincidence that this paper is single authored.
1dogenous and not exogenously determined by some matching protocol like in most
experimental studies. The natural question arising is if endogenous parnership form-
ation increases or decreases the e¢ ciency level of partnerships. Intuitively, one can
think of di⁄erent behaviour arising from endogenous partnership formation. Return
to our leading quote for instance. Suppose someone has found one of the rare sel￿ ess
business partners. What will this person do? One natural reaction would be to be-
have very cooperatively and please the business partner with the aim to prevent the
sel￿ ess partner to walk away from the partnership. Such a scenario indicates that the
threat of breaking a partnership might be bene￿cial in the sense that it provides in-
centives for cooperation and hence yields more e¢ cient partnerships. However, there
is another possible behaviour: hit-and-run. Some people might initially take max-
imum advantage of the sel￿ ess business partner by free-riding as much as possible.
Subsequently, breaking up with the sel￿ ess partner allows to escape the potentially
angry reaction (i.e. reduced contributions due to negative reciprocity). Such a hit-
and-run strategy is the more pro￿table the higher the likelihood to ￿nd another
sel￿ ess sucker later on. Based on these two scenarios it seems unclear a priori if
endogenous partnership formation has a positive or negative impact on e¢ ciency.
We design a set of experimental treatments to investigate the impact of part-
nership formation on e¢ ciency. Subjects play multiple two-player public goods
games, where partnership formation is endogenous. After each phase of four games
subjects can decide to break up or not. In the case of a separation, subjects are
re-matched according to their stated preferences for a new partner (using a stable
marriage mechanism). We introduce treatment variations in two dimensions. Along
one dimension the ￿nancial consequences of the break-up decision di⁄er. Break-
ing up is either ￿nancially bene￿cial or costly relative to staying in a partnership.
Along the second dimension, the information subjects have on potential matches,
we vary if a subject knows the contribution history of potential matches or only
sees some characteristics when preferences for future partners are expressed. This
design is complemented by three control treatments, which are random re-matching
with and without information on the history of the partner and a traditional partner
matching.
This design provides ￿beyond our applied interest ￿answers to some methodolo-
gical questions. The existing literature on the e⁄ect of endogenous group formation
on contributions in public goods games contains mixed evidence. In some studies
and treatments contributions have increased, in some others they have not. Typ-
ically, unilateral re-matching (Coricelli, Fehr, and Fellner 2004) in constant-sized
groups or restricted entry to variable-sized groups (Ahn, Isaak, and Salmon 2008)
increase contributions. Restricted entry is bene￿cial in congested public goods games
(Ahn, Isaac, and Salmon 2009). Preference based re-matching with information on
past contributions, where re-matching is compulsory is shown to increase contribu-
tions by Page, Putterman, and Unel (2005). Almost full e¢ ciency is reached in
Cinyabuguma, Page, and Putterman (2005), where subjects can by majority vote
permanently expel others to a group of losers with lower endowments and a smaller
number of people. Automatic regrouping according to contribution-level strata adds
an equilibrium to the standard free-riding equilibrium, which is near-e¢ cient and
is typically played in experiments (Gunnthorsdottir, Vragov, Seifert, and McCabe
22010). In other studies bilateral matching fails to have a positive e⁄ect on e¢ ciency
(Hauk and Nagel 2001; Coricelli, Fehr, and Fellner 2004).
We provide the ￿rst study with a ￿xed group size, di⁄erent information environ-
ments, a simple, stable matching mechanism, voluntary breakups and (dis)incentives
to breakup. This design allows for a clean separation of the e⁄ects of voluntary
breakups with re-matching and the in￿ uence of breakup cost and history. Our design
holds many factors that varied in other studies across treatments (e.g. group-size or
the re-matching procedure) constant in the four partnership treatments. Further-
more, this study is the ￿rst that investigates the role of reputation in the matching
process and its impact on contributions.
We ￿nd that endogenous group formation can increase e¢ ciency. Both the pro-
vision of contribution history at the time of re-matching and bonuses for staying in
a partnership have positive e⁄ects. At least one of the two positive factors has to be
present for an e¢ ciency improvement. The presence of both leads to the best res-
ults. Deeper analysis shows that information on past contributions is bene￿cial for
e¢ ciency due to two di⁄erent e⁄ects: a level e⁄ect and a dynamic e⁄ect. We identify
an anticipation e⁄ect, where subjects that know that their contribution will be seen
by future potential partners, conjecture that a higher contribution will improve their
changes of getting good partners. This e⁄ect increases the level of contributions in
treatments with history. The dynamic e⁄ect works as follows: subjects, who are
broken up with unilaterally, do not reduce their contributions in the next period if
history is provided, while they signi￿cantly reduce contributions if history is absent.
This works for victims of hit-and-run attacks (i.e. a partner took advantage and
then broke up to avoid negative reciprocity) but also for subjects who were broken
up with because they contributed too little.
The positive e⁄ect of small bonuses for staying together in a partnership has to
do with the lower breakup rate it creates. We ￿nd that long-lasting partnerships
lead to the same high contributions in all treatments. Partnerships, where staying
together per se is bene￿cial because of a small bonus payment, lead to lower rates of
separation and hence produce more long-lasting partnerships, which per se induce
higher contributions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section lays out
our experimental design. Section 3 details the predictions made by standard game
theory and provides some alternative hypotheses. Subsequently, Section 4 provides a
￿rst look at the results by establishing di⁄erences in contribution levels and breakup
fractions across treatments. Section 5 investigates what determines the breakup
decisions, while Section 6 discusses the e⁄ects long-lasting partnerships have on
contributions. In order to establish some results on the dynamics of contributions,
Section 7 investigates the impact of breakups on subsequent contributions. Finally,
Section 8 summarises our results and concludes.
2 Experimental Design
We brie￿ y outline our experimental design below. All our treatments have in com-
mon that all subjects played 24 two-player public goods games. The di⁄erences
across treatments lie in di⁄erent matching procedures and information environments.
3We start by explaining the underlying public goods game.
2.1 Underlying public goods game
The underlying two-player public goods game we use is as follows: each of the
two partners is endowed with e = 100 points. Player i can decide on an amount
Ci 2 [0;100] to invest in a group project. Each unit of the endowment kept by player
i generates one point of payo⁄. Each point invested generates 0:8 points of return
for each of the two group members. The pro￿t from the group project for player
i is calculated as 0:8(Ci + Cj) points.2 Payo⁄s are symmetrical. Partners decide
simultaneously on their investment. Therefore, the payo⁄ of player i is:
￿i(Ci;Cj) := 100 ￿ Ci + 0:8(Ci + Cj); i;j 2 f1;2g;i 6= j:
This payo⁄ structure generates a social dilemma, as the net return of one unit of
investment for a player is negative (￿0:20); while the net social return per unit
of investment is positive (0:6): It is a dominant strategy (and therefore Nash) for
a purely sel￿sh player to invest nothing in the group project, while social welfare
is maximised when both players invest all their endowment. Note that the social
welfare W increases linearly with the average group investment ￿ C, as
W = 200 + 0:6(Ci + Cj)
= 200 + 1:2 ￿ C:
For this reason the average group contribution can be used as an indicator for the
degree to which a group is able to resolve the social dilemma situation.
2.2 Timing and re-matching
A session consists of 24 periods with six phases of four periods each. In each period
a partnership plays the two-player public goods game outlined above. After each
phase (except in the partner treatment) re-matching takes place. In the random
matching treatments all subjects are randomly re-matched with a new partner. In
the choice treatments there are two types of subjects. Only subjects with di⁄erent
types can be in a partnership.3 After each phase, subjects have to decide to stay
with their partner or to break up the partnership. A partnership ends if at least
one of the two subjects in a partnership decides to break up. All subjects who
are without a partner due to a partnership ending are re-matched according to
the stable marriage mechanism proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962). For this,
subjects are shown some information about the available subjects of the other type.
The information given depends on the treatment. Subjects then rank the available
potential partners with regard to how much they would like to be matched to these
￿singles￿ . Using these preference orderings a matching algorithm produces a stable
2Our underlying game di⁄ers from that used by Coricelli, Fehr, and Fellner (2004) only with
respect to the endowment (100 vs. 25).
3In real-world terms the types could be male vs. female, worker vs. employer, seller vs. buyer,
R&D department vs. Sales department, etc.
4new matching. A stable matching is such that any two not matched subjects do not
both prefer to be matched to each other over the match they have been assigned by
the algorithm.4 Subsequently, the newly formed partnerships play four public goods
games followed by the next break-up and re-matching stage. This is repeated until
all six phases of four public goods games are completed.
The underlying stable-marriage matching mechanism is quite complex. For this
reason we decided not to fully explain to the participants how the algorithm works,
as this could have produced some confusion resulting in very noisy behaviour. In the
instructions we described the working of the algorithm as follows: ￿The computer
will collect the rankings from every ￿ single￿and re-match all ￿ singles￿according to
these rankings. The partner you are matched with is determined by your preferences
and the preferences of all other ￿ singles￿ . The computer is programmed to give you
the best partner available.￿The omission of detail on the matching algorithm seems
justi￿ed, as we are not primarily interested in the working of the mechanism. In
a later section, we will brie￿ y investigate how our matching mechanism performed
with respect to subjects giving the highest preferences to subjects with the highest
past contributions.
2.3 Treatments
In total, we have seven treatments. We employ a 2x2 design for endogenous part-
nership formation and add three control treatments. We vary whether remaining in
a partnership (i.e. not breaking up with or being broken with) is costly or bene￿cial.
We implemented this by either paying a reward of 10 points (bene￿cial treatments)
or deducting 10 points (costly treatments) whenever a subject decided not to break
up. Note that this reward or cost is very small compared to the payo⁄ from the
four public goods games in a phase for which subjects play together. If partners
play Nash in the public goods game they receive 400 points each, while they earn
640 points if they fully cooperate and play strategies maximising social welfare. By
introducing this small cost or bene￿t for staying together we intend to switch the
equilibrium from always breaking up to always staying together without introducing
large payo⁄ di⁄erences across treatments.
The other dimension we vary is the information subjects have when they ex-
press their preferences over potential ￿singles￿in the re-matching process. In one
condition (characteristics) only the favourite colour and the other subjects￿answers
to some hypothetical question designed to elicit social preferences are known. In
order to maintain control, these characteristics were elicited in all seven treatment
prior to the actual experiment in a questionnaire. Subjects did not know that these
informations would be displayed to other players later on. The ￿rst question on the
questionnaire purely reveals a preference over something that should not be relevant
4The Gale-Shapley mechanism produces two potentially di⁄erent sets of stable matches depend-
ing on which type has the proposer power. The subjects with the proposer power do better with
respect to getting matches they prefer. The match is proposer-optimal in the sense that there
is no other stable matching under which the proposer does better. For this reason we randomly
determined in each rematching phase which type was given the propser power. This also mittigates
the problem of an incentive to misrepresent the preferences for the group without proposer power.
See also Alcalde (1996).
5for the experiment. ￿What is your favourite colour?￿The possible answers (tick
boxes next to a box ￿lled with the actual colours on screen) are: ￿Red￿ , ￿Yellow￿ ,
￿Green￿ , ￿Purple￿ , and ￿Blue￿ . The intention of providing subjects with the colour
preferences of their choice is to allow subjects to choose according to similarity if
they want. The second question we ask is supposed to capture social preferences.
We provide the subject with a hypothetical scenario: ￿Suppose you have won the
lottery. Your prizes are a house, a luxury car and an overseas trip for two people.
Which object(s) are you keeping for yourself and which are you giving to a family
member?￿Observing what a person would keep allows for an estimate of how sel￿sh
a person is (or pretends to be). Subjects who observe what the potential matches
indicated to keep for themselves, have the opportunity to either choose the person
that is least sel￿sh or the person that is most similar to themselves.
In the history treatments subjects are provided with the average investment of
potential matches from the previous phase in addition to the information provided
to subjects in the characteristics treatments. Subjects choice can still be based on
either similarity or on the perceived degree of social orientation. However, here sub-
jects are able to strategically in￿ uence what potential matches know when choosing,
as they are aware that potential matches will see their past investment. Furthermore,
here signalling a high level of social orientation has payo⁄ consequences and there-
fore should be more credible than the answers to a question. The history treatments
add reputation as a factor.
As control treatments we add a classical partner treatment, where no re-matching
takes place, while the phase structure (i.e. blocks of four games) is retained. In
the remaining two control treatments compulsory random re-matching takes place
every four periods. Here, as in the endogenous matching treatments we have a
characteristics and a history treatment. In the characteristics treatment subjects
receive the characteristics information on their new partner after each re-matching,
while in the random history treatment also the new partner￿ s contribution history
is given.5 Table 1 summarises our design with the four endogenous partnership
formation treatments in the upper half and the three control treatments in the
bottom half.
3 Predictions and Hypothesis
The predictions following standard theory (Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium with
purely sel￿sh rational agents) is straight-forward. In the last public goods game and
in any treatment subjects have a dominant strategy not to invest anything. The
unique subgame-perfect continuation following any history in any treatment is for
both players not to invest. Subjects￿foreseeing that play in the penultimate period
will be independent from the history have no incentive to invest in the penultimate
5In order to keep the information across treatments with di⁄erent matching protocols constant
we also provided the subjects in the endogenous matching treatments with the same information
on their new match as in the corresponding random matching treatment (characterisitcs, history)
.
6Information available when choosing partner
characteristics only also contrib. history
Remaining is bene￿cial bene￿cial, characteristics bene￿cial, history
Remaining is costly costly, characteristics costly, history
Information available after re-matching
characteristics only also contrib. history
Matching is random random, characteristics random, history
Matching is ￿xed partner
Table 1: The seven experimental treatments
period. For the treatments without choice moving backwards in the game tree and
repeatedly applying the argument above leads to the insight that there is a unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where no one invests in any of the 24 public goods
games. The same logic also extends to the treatments where every four rounds a
decision on breaking up or not has to be made.
Suppose a player has to decide to break up or not with one phase to play. A player
should anticipate that regardless of the identity of the partner for the last four rounds
no investment will occur along the equilibrium path. The breakup decision will not
in￿ uence the payout from the subsequent public goods games. Break-up decisions
therefore should solely be based on whether staying together yields a bonus or is
costly. In the case where staying together is bene￿cial the unique subgame perfect
continuation requires both players not to break up, while in any subgame perfect
continuation where staying together is costly the players break up. The same logic
applies for earlier partnership decisions. Furthermore, in the case of a breakup (on
the equilibrium path for the costly treatments or o⁄ the equilibrium path in the
bene￿cial treatment) subjects are indi⁄erent about who they want to be matched
with, as all players will never invest anyway.
Summary Standard theory predicts zero investment in all treatments and public
goods games. Breakups never occur in the bene￿cial treatments, while they
always occur in the costly treatments. In the case of being ￿single￿subjects
are indi⁄erent between all potential matches.
Given the large body of literature on cooperation in social dilemmas we do not
expect subjects to behave the way traditional theory predicts. Typically, behaviour
in repeated public goods games is quite heterogeneous. Conditional cooperators
coexist with sel￿sh players (Fischbacher and G￿chter 2010; Bayer, Renner, and
Sausgruber 2009; Fischbacher, G￿chter, and Fehr 2001, show this.). Even a fully
rational, sel￿sh agent might ￿nd it optimal to contribute positive amounts if she
anticipates that it is su¢ ciently likely to be paired with a conditional cooperator.
Positive contributions can be bene￿cial in the long term, since conditional cooper-
ators￿contributions are positively correlated with the partners contributions in the
past. In general, contribution decisions become strategic as soon as subjects be-
lief (or know) that there exist other subjects that condition their contributions on
past behaviour of partners (such as the mentioned conditional cooperators but also
7imitators and the like). This is similar for break-up decisions. If there is reason
for a subject to expect to be re-matched with a partner who contributes a di⁄erent
amount than the current partner, then the breaking up decision becomes strategic.
In such a case the theoretical prediction of only observing breakups in the costly and
no breakups at all in the bene￿cial partnership treatment does not necessarily hold
anymore. A player who is matched to a ￿nice￿person, who typically invests some or
even all of the endowment, ￿nds it pro￿table not to break up a partnership that is
costly to maintain if she believes that the expected investment of a new match will
be much lower. Similarly, a person in the bene￿cial partnership treatment might in
contrast to the prediction break a partnership if he beliefs that the expected future
partner will make contributions, which are su¢ ciently higher to make up for the loss
from the breakup. With this in mind we form the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 In the treatments with choice and bene￿cial partnerships some
breakups will occur. Subjects in the costly partnership treatment will not always
break up. The breakup frequency is higher than that in the bene￿cial partnership
treatment though.
The option of ending a partnership should impact on investment behaviour if
there are types that are not purely sel￿sh or rational. A person who is paired with
a kind investor might want to prevent being broken up with by investing more than
he otherwise would. Note that these investment incentives are operating in addition
to the typical incentives of keeping conditional cooperators investing. A priory it
is not clear what one should expect with respect to di⁄erences in investment levels
across treatments. The relation between the information subjects have on their
potential matches and contributions seems clearest. We conjecture the following for
the impact of reputation.
Hypothesis 2 Ceteris paribus, investments are higher in the treatments where sub-
jects have information on the history of other singles before they express preferences
for who they want to be matched with.
There are (at least) two mechanisms that could lead to increased contributions
in the history treatments. Firstly, in these treatments, where subjects know the con-
tribution history of the partner one would expect subjects to express preferences for
subjects who have contributed more in the past. Then the stable marriage mechan-
ism will lead to some kind of segregation. Higher contributors will be matched with
the like, while free riders will end up with free riders. If subjects anticipate this or
learn this during the course of the experiment then we would expect that providing
the history ceteris paribus increases contributions, as the only way of avoiding to get
stuck with a low contributor are higher contributions (i.e. building a reputation).
Secondly, a breakup can not only be the result of the wish to get away from a mean
partner but can also give subjects the chance to avoid potential negative reciprocity
after having exploited their partner. If the contribution history is not known when
re-matching takes place, then misbehaving in a partnership, breaking up and mov-
ing on to another partner, who can be exploited, is a potentially pro￿table strategy.
Su¢ ciently many subjects with this strategy will lead to low contributions. In the
treatments where the contribution history is known at the re-matching stage such
8a hit and run strategy is not pro￿table, as the stable-marriage mechanism will en-
sure that the subjects, who practice such a strategy, will be matched with other
low contributing singles. Eliminating the hit-and-run strategy should lead to higher
contributions.
Looking at the second dimension of our treatment variation (whether opting to
stay in a partnership yields a reward or a penalty) does not allow for a clear hypo-
thesis. First, recall that the actual rewards for or costs of a continued partnership
are comparatively small but still vary the incentive of breaking up or not consider-
ably. On the one hand it seems plausible that costly partnership maintenance will
lead to higher contributions, as higher contributions are necessary to prevent being
dumped by the partner. On the other hand, if partnerships are costly to maintain,
then the mentioned hit-and-run strategy is more attractive, which hints at lower
contributions in the costly partnership treatment.
Further, and not yet discussed, psychological factors could impact on the dy-
namics of contributions. Suppose for example that subjects build up trust for each
other whenever their partnership survives a break-up stage. This trust comes in
addition to the typically observed reciprocity in partner treatments. Together trust
and reciprocity might be enough to prevent or delay the decline of contributions
we observe in standard partner treatments. If this is the case, then the expected
lower separation rates in the reward treatment could in later periods lead to higher
investment compared to the costly partnership treatments. In summary we have
to say that at this point the direction of impact of the monetary consequences of
the break-up decision on contributions is not easily predictable. We formulate an
unspeci￿c hypothesis for this reason.
Hypothesis 3 Investment levels vary across treatments with di⁄erent payo⁄ con-
sequences for staying in a partnership.
4 Results ￿a ￿rst look
We conducted 16 sessions with 16 to 20 subjects each using the software z-tree
(Fischbacher 2007). Over-all 296 subjects participated. The experiments took place
between October 2008 and July 2010 at the Adelaide Laboratory for Experimental
Economics (AdLab). A typical session lasted for about half an hour. Subjects were
paid one Australian Dollar for every 150 points of pro￿t in the experiments. On
average subjects earned about 23 Dollars. Table 2 summarises the demographics
of the subjects who participated. In the next sections we will present the main
results. We start by giving a general overview over di⁄erences in investment and
partnership formation in the di⁄erent treatments. A more detailed investigation
highlighting particular aspects that drive the aggregate results follows.
4.1 Cooperation ￿levels and within-group correlation
Figure 1 shows average investment per period in the di⁄erent treatments on the
top panel and averages over phases in the lower panel. Table 3 contains average
9Frequency Percent
gender Male 184 62:16
Female 112 39:84









age>24 No 232 78:38
Yes 64 21:62
higher maths Yes 228 77:03
No 68 22:97
subjects N 296 100:00
Table 2: Demographic characteristics of the subjects
investment aggregated over the phases and adds median investment and breakup
fractions. Generally, as in most public goods games, we observe that in all treatments
average investment is well above the equilibrium prediction of zero. We also observe
di⁄erences in investment for the di⁄erent treatments.
Remarkably, in the bene￿cial partnership treatment with history the median in-
vestment in phases three to six is 100, which is the socially e¢ cient full-cooperation
investment. Investments in this treatment are higher than in any other treatment.
Furthermore, investments are higher in the endogenous partnership treatments than
in the corresponding random re-matching treatments if either staying in a partner-
ship is bene￿cial or the investment history of potential matches is known when
re-matching preferences have to be expressed. Investments are highest if both is the
case. The opportunity to break up with a partner and being re-matched according
to preferences does not increase cooperation compared to the corresponding random
re-matching treatment if staying in a partnership is costly and re-matching prefer-
ences can only be based on some characteristics (such as the favourite colour and































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2:5 bene￿cial, characteristics & costly, history
4 random history
6 costly, characteristics & random, characteristics & partner
di⁄erences all signi￿cant with p < 0:01 or insigni￿cant with p > 0:1
Table 4: Mann-Whitney U-test ranking of treatments with respect to investment
The impact of knowing the history when re-matching takes place is also preserved
when re-matching is automatic and random. Investments are higher in the random
history treatment than in the random characteristics treatment. Moreover, forced
re-matching with displaying the history leads to more cooperation than a classical
partner matching. There the over-all better performance of the re-matching treat-
ment among the control treatments originates from the ￿rst three to four phases,
while in phases ￿ve and six no di⁄erences are observed across the control treatments.
Mann-Whitney U tests con￿rm all the observations made above. Table 4 shows the
ranking of treatments with respect to the over all level of investment. Treatments
where the contributions were not signi￿cantly di⁄erent share the same rank.
If we use individual contributions and pool them then all di⁄erences are signi-
￿cant at p < 0:01.6 Aggregating the data on the subject level in order to allow for
correlation within a subject, leaves the ranking in tact but by design reduces the
signi￿cance levels somewhat. We summarise our ￿ndings in the following observa-
tions.
observation 1 When re-matching can occur (forced and randomly or endogen-
ously) than providing the information on past contributions of the new (potential)
partner increases over-all cooperation compared to the case where only information
on characteristics is provided.
observation 2 Endogenous group formation with rewards for staying in a part-
nership ceteris paribus leads to more cooperation than partnerships that are costly
to stay in. Endogenous group formation with costly partnerships, where only char-
acteristics about the potential new partners are known, do not increase cooperation
compared to random re-matching where the same information is given.
Beyond the observation that levels di⁄er across treatments, it is also of interest
how contribution levels within a partnership are related. One would expect subjects￿
contributions to be highly correlated if an equity motive or reciprocity is present.7
Average phase contributions of partners are highly correlated. The correlation coef-
￿cients are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero in all treatment and range from 0:55 in
6The four pairwise comparisons where we do not ￿nd signi￿cant di⁄erences yield p-values of
0:99; 0:58; 0:42 and 0:13:
7The study of Croson (2007) shows that such correlation favours reciprocity over altruism and













































Avg contribution subj. 2
Figure 2: Scatterplot of contributions within a group
the random history treatment to 0:88 in the costly characteristics treatment. For
both information conditions the correlation is higher for the two treatments where
there is partnership choice than in the random matching treatment.8 Giving sub-
jects the opportunity to break up a partnership leads to subjects equalising their
investment within a phase. The correlation of the within phase contributions in the
endogenous group formation treatments is even higher than in the control treatment
with partner matching (￿ = 0:74). Figure 2 shows scatterplots that visualise the
high correlations.
observation 3 Average contributions of subjects within partnerships are highly
correlated. The correlation is stronger in treatments with partner choice.
More interesting than the well documented fact that contributions within groups
are correlated, is the variation in the strength of correlation across treatments. The
option of breaking up and the risk of being broken up with seems to add some
pressure to contribute similar amounts like the partner in order to prevent being
broken up with.
8We have correlations of 0:78 in each of the history treatments with choice versus 0:55 in the
random history treatment. In the characteristics treatements with choice the correlations are 0:80
and 0:88 versus 0:69 in the random characterstics treatment.
144.2 Breakups
In this section we take a ￿rst look at breakup decisions. Figure 3 plots the fractions
of breakups in the di⁄erent treatments by phases. On the left we plot the fraction
of individual break-up decisions, while we show the fractions of partnerships that
are broken up on the right. A test of proportions ￿as expected ￿reveals that
the breakup decisions are less frequent in the two treatments where remaining in a
partnership pays a small reward than in the treatments where it incurs a small cost
(p < 0:01 for all pairwise comparisons with pooled data). The stark prediction from
standard theory that in the bene￿cial partnership treatments no breakup occurs,





































































Figure 3: Breakup rates by treatment
The variation of the information about potential future partners a subject re-
ceives only leads to signi￿cantly di⁄erent breakup rates if it is costly to stay in a
partnership. There the breakup rate is higher when information about past history
is not provided (p < 0:01): There is no signi￿cant di⁄erence across the bene￿cial
partnership treatments (p > 0:92). In itself the pure breakup rates across treat-
ments are not very informative, since one would expect that contributions are an
important factor driving separation decisions. We begin our in-depths analysis with
identifying the determinants of breakup decisions.
4.3 Re-matching preferences
It is instructive to investigate how subjects cast their preferences for a new partner,
when they are in the pool of singles following a broken partnership. This obviously
shows if our design choice of not fully explaining the Gale-Shapley marriage mech-
anism caused any problems. We will see that this is not the case. More interestingly,
this analysis can shed some light on why history has an impact on contributions.
Recall that in the history treatments subjects saw the average contribution of all
15ben, hist ben, char costly, hist costly, char
1st pref to highest avg. 0:772 0:475 0:728 0:112
(actual cases / N) (34=44) (19=40) (67=92) (14=124)
Exp. fraction (random choice) 0:318 0:400 0:196 0:161
(exp. cases / N) (14=44) (16=40) (18=92) (20=124)
Variance (random choice) 9:167 9:167 14:029 16:71
p-value$ 0:015￿ 0:371 < 0:001￿ 0:640
$Halt : 1st preference more often for the single with the highest average than under random play
Table 5: Tests on the in￿ uence of the history on preferences for partners
potential new partners when they had to rank partners according to their prefer-
ence for entering a partnership with them. In the characteristics treatments subjects
only had some information about a hypothetical question on social preferences and
the preferred colours of the potential partners. Conventional theory predicts that in
both cases subjects expecting zero contributions in the future are indi⁄erent between
all potential partners. Not surprisingly, Table 5 reveals that the fraction of subjects
assigning the highest preference to the potential partner with the highest average
contribution in the past four rounds is higher in the history treatments.9 This
observation in itself is not very informative yet. Recall that breakup rates varied
considerably across treatments. This implies that the number of subjects in the pool
of potential partners varied, too. Then a subject who disregards any information
about past history or characteristics that might be related to it might choose ran-
domly (just as predicted by conventional theory). In that case the probability that
the person with the highest past contributions is chosen decreases with the number
of subjects in the pool. In order to clearly identify if subjects systematically chose
the partner with the best history we have to take this into account. For this reason
we constructed a statistical test for this by treatment, with the null-hypothesis that
subjects choose randomly.10
The test con￿rms that the high rates of ￿rst preferences for the subjects with the
highest past average contribution in the two history treatments (approximately 77
and 73 percent) are extremely unlikely to result from random choice. For subjects
that are not given any history when they express their preferences we cannot reject
the null-hypothesis of random choice.
9The numbers exclude cases where subjects had no real choice, as only one potential partner
was in the pool of singles.
10The test statistic is the number of ￿rst preferences for the subject with the highest average
contribution. Under the null hypothesis this test statistic is distributed according to a convolution
of binomial distributions with di⁄erent success probabilities and numbers of draws (according to
the number of subjects in a particular single pool). We approximate the exact distribution by a
normal distribution matching the ￿rst two moments, which typically performs well (Butler and
Stephens 1993).
16observation 4 If subjects know the singles￿contributions from the last phase,
when they express preferences for a new partner, then the ￿rst preference goes
in about three quarters of the cases to the person where the average past phase
contribution was highest. This rate is signi￿cantly higher than under random choice.
observation 5 If subjects do only know the characteristics of the prospective new
partners then they do not signi￿cantly more often choose the partner with the
highest average phase contribution than randomisation would.
The latter observation seems obvious. If someone does not know the past con-
tributions then he cannot condition his choice on it. However, subjects know how
someone has answered a hypothetical decision problem that is related to social pref-
erences. If the answers to the hypothetical decision problems were correlated with
actual behaviour then a preference for subjects with the highest self-stated social
orientation would lead to ￿rst preferences going to high investors. This is not the
case. Knowing the stated social orientation is not enough to lead to matching pref-
erences favouring higher contributors. The reason for this is that the answers in the
hypothetical decision problem are not correlated with actual contribution behaviour.
The two observations above have an important implication. If subjects know the
history at the point of re-matching, then their expressed preferences for the high-
contributors lead via the stable marriage mechanism to high contributors being
paired together. This means that a higher contribution pays in these treatments,
since it makes re-matching with a high-contributor more likely in the case of a
breakup. This in turn might lead to high contributors having stronger incentives
to break up with low contributors in the history treatments. In the characterist-
ics treatments both incentives are absent. The incentive to invest in the history
treatments in order to increase the probability of being matched with a subject
who invests heavily can nicely explain at least some di⁄erence in investment levels
between history and characteristics treatments with endogenous group formation.
In the next Section we check if actual breakup decision are indeed in￿ uenced by the
information condition.
5 When do people break partnerships?
From the standpoint of standard theory the decision to break up or not in equilib-
rium is trivial. Breaking up or staying together does not have any expected future
payo⁄ consequences, as anyone contributes zero at all times in equilibrium. So only
the immediate payo⁄ impact of the decision matters, which is determined by the
assignment to a bene￿cial or costly treatment. If assigned to the former a subject
should decide to stay in a partnership, while in the latter breaking up is the equilib-
rium action. Given the observations that a) subjects invest positive amounts and b)
that investment levels are heterogenous across subjects, the decision becomes quite
complex. A subject might compare the expected future contribution of the current
partner to that of a potential new match. There is a further potential consequence
of breaking up or not a subject might want to take into account. Deciding to stay
in a partnership could be seen as a kind act by the other group member, which then
17could trigger positive reciprocity in the form of increased (or at least sustained)
investment. In general, the only clear prediction is that the propensity to break up
decreases with the contribution of the current partner.
In what follows (in Table 6) we present the results from a random-e⁄ects logit
regression, where the decision to break up is the dependent variable. We see that
the decision to break up is driven by two things: a) how well the partnership worked
and b) the information subjects are given when they express their preferences for
partners to be re-matched with. We have seen that contributions in a phase and
partnership are strongly correlated within but also across subjects. Therefore it is
not necessary to include all eight contributions of the two partners in a partnership
when predicting if a subject decides to break up or not. We conducted extensive
speci￿cation tests and concluded that including the maximum and the minimum
contribution of both partners is su¢ cient. Checking for treatment-speci￿c e⁄ects
of contributions (by introducing interaction terms) revealed that the impact of the
maximum own contribution only had an impact in the history treatments.
BREAKUP Coe¢ cient Avg. Marginal E⁄ect
Treatment (base is bene￿cial, history)
bene￿cial, character 1:920 (1:017) 0:201 (0:108)
costly, history 1:116￿ (0:483) 0:119￿ (0:051)
costly, character 3:748￿￿ (0:983) 0:401￿￿ (0:098)
Maximum and minimum contributions of the partner
min_other ￿0:024￿￿ (0:005) ￿0:003￿￿ (0:001)
max_other ￿0:020￿￿ (0:007) ￿0:002￿￿ (0:001)
Maximum and minimum of own contribution (max interacted with history)
min_own ￿0:029￿￿ (0:005) ￿0:003￿￿ (0:001)
max_own 0:006 (0:009) 0:001 (0:001)
max_own x history 0:034￿￿ (0:011) 0:004￿￿ (0:001)
Phase (base is one)
two 0:060 (0:349) 0:006 (0:037)
three ￿0:139 (0:356) ￿0:015 (0:038)
four ￿0:403 (0:369) ￿0:043 (0:039)
￿ve ￿0:895￿ (0:382) ￿0:096￿￿ (0:041)





Number of subjects 150
Standard errors in parentheses; ￿￿p < 0:01, ￿p < 0:05;
Table 6: Tobit panel-regression explaining breakup decisions
18The regression results are as follows. Not very surprisingly, subjects￿probabil-
ity to break up decreases with the partners maximum and minimum contribution.
Ceteris paribus the probability of a subject breaking up with the partner is about
￿fty percentage points higher if the partner did not contribute at all than if the
partner always contributed in full. The simple rationale for this is the expectation
that the lower the contribution of the partner the higher is the likelihood to be
re-matched to a better partner after breaking up.
observation 6 Subjects are more likely to break up with partners who have lower
minimum and maximum investments.
Furthermore, we see that subjects with high minimum contributions are less
likely to break up. The magnitude of this e⁄ect is about the same size as that of the
minimum contribution of the partner. A potential explanation for this has to do with
subjects foreseeing others to reciprocate. A low minimum contribution that typically
occurs in the last period of a phase, indicates a subject being unkind to the partner
by either not contributing much at all over the phase or strategically contributing
early to free ride in the last period. A subject doing this might anticipate that
staying in the partnership will cause negative reciprocity and low contributions of
the partner in the next phase. Then it might be better to look for a new partner
(and potentially repeat the same hit-and-run strategy).
observation 7 Higher own minimum contributions reduce the likelihood of a sub-
ject breaking up.
The maximum own investment in a phase has no signi￿cant impact on the break-
up decision in all the treatments. However, in the treatments, where the history
of a subject is known, when re-matching preferences are expressed, subjects who
have made higher maximum investments are ￿everything else equal ￿more likely
to break up with their partners. This highlights the role of reputation. Subjects
who contribute high maximum amounts are con￿dent to have a high likelihood
of emerging from the re-matching process with a high contributor when history is
provided and therefore are more inclined to break up. Furthermore, the maximum
contribution, which typically occurs in the ￿rst game of a phase, is an indication for
the expectation of what the level of contributions in a working partnership should
be. For a given contribution behaviour of the other player it is more likely to be
disappointed in these expectations the higher the maximum own contribution is.
A disappointed subject can do two things, either adjust the expectations or break
up the partnership hoping that the new partner will ful￿ll the expectations. In the
history treatments subjects are more con￿dent to ￿nd a good partner and rather
do the latter, while without information on past contributions the former is the
behaviour observed more often.
observation 8 Higher own maximum contributions increase the tendency to break
up in the history treatments.
The impact of whether staying in a partnership yields a bonus or incurs a cost
is as expected. Pairwise Wald tests con￿rm that in the costly treatments breakup
rates are higher (p < 0:03 with history and p < 0:01 with characteristics).
19observation 9 Controlling for contribution behaviour breakups are more likely to
occur in the treatments where staying in a partnership is costly.
Summing up our ￿ndings on breakup decisions, we see that partnerships that
work well are more likely to stay together. We also found evidence for hit-and-
run behaviour. Information on history during the re-matching process makes high-
contribution subjects more con￿dent that the re-matching will lead to a better
match. This implies that subjects who want to keep their high-contribution partner
will need to contribute more in the history treatments than in the characteristics
treatments.
6 The impact of lasting partnerships
In this section we search for the underlying driving force for the di⁄erences in con-
tribution levels across treatments with endogenous partnership formation. Figure
4 documents that a stable partnership yields high contributions. Here we plot the
average contributions of partnerships that are stable, which we de￿ne as having
survived two breakup stages, and contrast them with the average contributions of
subjects, starting with a new partner (i.e. their old partnership ended just before
the phase in question). We see that the contributions of lasting partnerships are very
high in all treatments, while the contributions in newly formed groups are signi￿c-
antly lower (Mann-Whitney U-test, p < 0:01 in all treatments). The main di⁄erence
across the treatments appear to be the level and the dynamics of the subjects who
are in new groups. The contributions of these subjects are higher in the history
treatments if compared to the characteristics treatments (Mann-Whitney U-test;
p < 0:01). Across the history treatments there is not di⁄erence (p > 0:85):
In what follows, we estimate a random-e⁄ect panel Tobit with individual invest-
ments as the dependent variable. We include a set of dummy variables that captures
how many phases the partners have played together. This allows us to investigate
how partnership formation impacts on contribution levels. We control for common
dynamics. For this purpose, we add phase dummies, dummies that capture the
period within a phase and a dummy for the ￿nal period of the experiment. Further
controls for subject characteristics are also added. Finally, dummies for the di⁄er-
ent treatments are included. These dummies can be interpreted as the remaining
di⁄erences in contributions that can be attributed to the di⁄erent treatments, once
we control for the common e⁄ects resulting from partnership formation. Table 7
reports the coe¢ cients and the marginal e⁄ects.11
The regression shows that over-all the number of phases played with the same
partner is positively related to the investment.12 Note that this cannot be inter-
11We use the marginal e⁄ects giving the change in expected investment due to the change of a
variable at the population mean taking into account the probability that censoring might occur
before or after the change of the dependent variable. See Green (2003)[p 765] for a discussion of
di⁄erent marginal e⁄ects in Tobit regressions.
12All di⁄erences except between partnerships that play in the ￿fth and in the sixth phase together
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Figure 4: Investment and group stability by treatment
preted as a causal relationship, as subjects who in general contribute more are less
likely to be broken up with. For this reason the estimated e⁄ect here represents a
compound of a selection and a stable-partnership e⁄ect. However, there is evidence
that the signi￿cant coe¢ cients on the periods spent with the same partner are not
only the result of selection. Here we exploit the variation across the cost dimen-
sion. Observe that after controlling for the number of phases together there is no
signi￿cant di⁄erence in contributions across treatments with di⁄erent cost within
one information condition (history or characteristics) anymore. That means that
in general there is no tendency for higher contributions under costly or bene￿cial
partnerships. Over all, contributions are higher in the bene￿cial partnership treat-
ments though. So where can this di⁄erence come from? Having ceteris paribus lower
breakup rates in the bene￿cial treatments tells us that on average there are more
long-term partnerships. Together with the observation that per se there are no con-
tribution di⁄erences across treatments we can conclude that staying together in a
partnership per se increases contributions. This suggests that the good performance
of long lasting partnerships is not only the cause of a selection e⁄ect. Moreover,
the fact that breakup rates are lower in the bene￿cial condition together with our
￿ndings that longer-lasting partnerships do better implies that environments, where
staying in a partnership is bene￿cial per se, are more e¢ cient. It is worth noting that
21INVESTMENT Coe¢ cient Marginal E⁄ect
Treatments (base is bene￿cial, history)
bene￿cial, characteristics ￿19:25￿ (9:124) ￿12:21￿ (5:951)
costly, history ￿6:73 (9:213) ￿4:17 (5:802)
costly, characteristics ￿30:92￿￿ (9:029) ￿19:84
￿￿ (5:951)
random, history ￿12:28 (9:452) ￿7:70 (6:059)
random, characteristics ￿27:58￿￿ (9:305) ￿17:68￿￿ (6:134)
Phases with current partner (base is ￿rst)
second 12:93￿￿ (2:155) 7:58￿￿ (1:227)
third 23:65￿￿ (2:829) 13:19￿￿ (1:459)
fourth 39:05￿￿ (3:643) 19:96￿￿ (1:569)
￿fth 52:87￿￿ (4:718) 24:67￿￿ (1:651)
sixth 54:92￿￿ (5:007) 25:17￿￿ (1:434)
Phase (base is one)
two 4:65￿ (1:991) 2:81￿ (1:187
three 3:86 (2:031) 2:34 (1:216)
four ￿1:13 (2:051) 0:69 (1:246)
￿ve ￿3:55 (2:085) ￿2:19 (1:299)
six ￿4:56 (2:292) ￿2:81￿ (1:434)
Period in the phase (base is one)
two 0:98 (1:566) 0:56 (0:953)
three ￿0:51 (1:570) ￿0:31 (0:961)
four ￿12:79￿￿ (1:665) ￿7:98￿￿ (1:071)
Final period ￿38:75￿￿ (3:528) ￿25:37￿￿ (2:337)
Controls (course, gender, math, lotto, color, age) not signi￿cant except





Number of subjects 224
Standard errors in parentheses; ￿￿p < 0:01, ￿p < 0:05;
Table 7: Tobit panel-regression for investment
the average number of periods a partnership is together is higher in the bene￿cial
condition for all phases after the ￿rst break-up phase.
observation 10 There is a stable partnership e⁄ect, i.e. stable partnerships are
more e¢ cient. This e⁄ect is not purely driven by the fact that subjects who con-
tribute more per se are less likely to be broken up with. Stable partnerships per se
are more e¢ cient.
Looking at the coe¢ cients on the treatment dummies, we see that there are some
22residual treatment e⁄ects even once we control for the e⁄ects of group-formation
dynamics. Comparing the history treatments to their corresponding characteristics
treatment reveals that investment tends to be higher if history is given.13 Along
the matching dimension, we do not ￿nd di⁄erences across di⁄erent treatments with
the same information condition. This suggests that the better over-all performance
of the history treatments cannot solely be explained by group-formation dynamics
and welfare enhancing e⁄ects of long-term stable partnerships. There must also be a
pure level e⁄ect.14 The pure fact that history is provided induces higher investments.
observation 11 Beyond e⁄ects stemming from di⁄erent group-formation dynam-
ics and long-term partnership e⁄ects in di⁄erent information conditions, providing
history increases contributions through a pure level e⁄ect.
7 Treatment-speci￿c e⁄ects of breakups
Finally, we investigate if there are treatment speci￿c e⁄ects that in￿ uence the con-
tribution dynamics. The main question is how subjects adjust their contributions
after the end of a phase conditional on the outcome of the breakup stage. As we will
show, contribution history has not only a positive level e⁄ect on contributions (as
shown above) but also prevents erosion of investments after breakups. We estimate
an interval regression, where the individual change of average phase investment to
the previous phase is the dependent variable. An interval regression is chosen to deal
with the truncation occurring on an individual level.15 In order to identify the e⁄ect
of breakup decisions on contributions we include dummies for the outcome of the
breakup stage before the phase in question. The dummies indicate if a subject has
been broken up with unilaterally, i.e. a subject wanted to continue a partnership but
the partner broke up, or if a subject chose to breakup herself.16 A partnership that
stayed together is used as the baseline.Treatment-speci￿c e⁄ects are obtained by in-
cluding treatment dummies (with the bene￿cial, history treatment as the baseline)
and their interactions with the partnership decision dummy. Since we have seen
in the previous section that lasting partnerships have a treatment independent im-
pact, we include a dummy for partnerships that entered into at least their third
phase together. We also include phase dummies to control for time e⁄ects. Subject
demographics (from a questionnaire after the experiment) and answers in the pre-
13The level of signi￿cance varies somewhat (bene￿cial p < 0:035; costly p < 0:01 and random
p < 0:1; all two-tailed Wald tests).
14Such a pure level e⁄ect can be thought of as an anticipation e⁄ect, as explained earlier. A
subject contributes more, since this increases the chance of better partners if there is information.
Alternatively, a social desirability e⁄ect could be at work. Subjects behave more cooperatively
when they know that other subjects will see their contributions.
15To see this, imagine a subject has invested on average ￿ ct￿1 in the last phase. Then the change
￿￿ c ￿ ￿ ct ￿ ￿ ct￿1 is restricted to the inverval [￿￿ ct;100￿ ￿ ct]: Our regression then estimates the e⁄ect
on an untruncated latent variable. Furthermore, observe that di⁄erencing takes out heterogeneity
in investment levels, which renders a cross-sectional model adequate. We report robust standard
errors though.
16Dividing the latter category in subcategories depending on if the other player also chose to
separate did not change the results.
23experimental questionnaire (favourite color and hypothetical choice after winning
the lottery) are also included as controls.
Our main question is the following: How can we explain the di⁄erences in dy-
namics across treatments? We have seen above that there is a composition e⁄ect,
i.e. partnerships that stay together for longer have higher contributions. The con-
tribution level in these groups are stable over time and similar across treatments
regardless of breakup rates. However, the number of long-lasting partnerships is
larger in the treatments where staying in the partnerships leads to a small reward
(i.e. the bene￿cial treatments). In addition to these composition e⁄ects we found
positive anticipation e⁄ects in the history treatments. Here we are concerned with
the dynamics caused by breakups. How are people reacting to breakups? Are they
increasing or decreasing their contribution and are there di⁄erences across treat-
ments? By controlling for the common e⁄ects of long-term partnerships we can
isolate the treatment speci￿c e⁄ects of di⁄erent kinds of breakups. This can shed
some light on why average contributions end up being lower in the characteristic
treatments than in the corresponding history treatments despite of similar breakup
rates and the fact that average contributions in period one are not very di⁄erent
within a matching protocol. Table 8 shows the regression results. We show both the
coe¢ cients (, which are identical to the marginal e⁄ects on an untruncated latent
variable) and the marginal e⁄ects on the truncated variable (the actual change in
investment) for a subject with an investment at the population average (, which is
68).
The regression reveals that the only signi￿cant di⁄erences in dynamics across
treatments lies in the behaviour of subjects who have been broken up with uni-
laterally. Subjects, who had this happen to them, react di⁄erently depending on
whether they are in a history or in a characteristics treatment. Subjects in the
history treatments do not signi￿cantly alter their average phase contribution. On
average subjects in the bene￿cial treatment with history tend to increase their con-
tributions. This increase is not signi￿cant (p > 0:15) though. The e⁄ect in the costly
history treatment is virtually zero. In contrast, subjects who are broken up with
unilaterally in the characteristics treatments react with signi￿cantly lower invest-
ment than in the previous phase than subjects in the history treatments (p < 0:023
for bene￿cial and p < 0:011 for costly, pairwise Wald tests). The total e⁄ect of be-
ing unilaterally broken up with (including the treatment speci￿c level e⁄ect) results
in a reduction of contributions in the characteristics treatments (p < 0:017 in the
costly and p < 0:088 in the bene￿cial condition). Contributions in all other cases
are stable with respect to the reaction to previous break-ups. However there is a
time e⁄ect. The common baseline changes in contributions from phase to phase are
jointly signi￿cant (p < 0:001; F-test), which indicates that time has an in￿ uence.
The time e⁄ects are negative and become stronger as time progresses (compared to
the baseline from phase two).17
17Individual phase e⁄ects are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero in total magnitude though (i.e.
once the constant is considered).
24CHANGE AVG. INVESTMENT Coe¢ cient Marginal E⁄ect￿
Treatments (base is bene￿cial, history)
bene￿cial, characteristics 2:04 (1:777) 1:97 (1:711)
costly, history ￿0:10 (2:032) ￿0:09 (1:966)
costly, characteristics ￿1:05 (2:091) ￿1:01 (2:026)
Partnership decision before current phase (base is staying together)
been broken up with 6:08 (4:288) 5:80 (4:027)
broken up 0:56 (3:492) 0:55 (3:375)
Interactions Treatment X Partnership Decision
be,cha X being broken up with ￿17:09￿ (7:359) ￿16:86￿ (7:323)
be,cha X broken up ￿1:07 (5:658) ￿1:04 (5:495)
co, hi X being broken up with ￿6:26 (5:631) ￿6:12 (5:550)
co, hi X broken up 1:79 (4:646) 1:73 (4:451)
co, cha X being broken up with ￿17:70￿￿ (6:059) ￿17:46￿￿ (6:031)
co, cha X broken up ￿2:69 (4:703) ￿2:61 (4:586)
Stable partnership (> 2 phases) 0:95 (1:975) 0:92 (1:909)
Phase (base is second)
third ￿4:70 (2:480) ￿4:64 (2:427)
fourth ￿7:41￿￿ (2:343) ￿7:22￿￿ (2:299)
￿fth ￿9:48￿￿ (2:594) ￿9:26￿￿ (2:549)
sixth ￿11:54￿￿ (2:381) ￿11:26￿￿ (2:344)




Number of subjects 150
￿ investment a the population mean; Standard errors in parentheses; ￿￿p < 0:01, ￿p < 0:05
Table 8: Interval regression for investment dynamics
observation 12 After being unilaterally broken up with subjects respond with
reducing their contributions in the characteristics treatments, while in the history
treatments this e⁄ect is absent.
To learn more about the reason for this negative e⁄ect of being broken up with
we checked the contribution history for those subjects in the character and history
treatments, who were unilaterally broken up with. Looking only at the cases where
a subject who had been contributing more than the person who unilaterally broke
up with them, shows where the e⁄ect comes from. In the history treatments on
average these subjects reduced their average investment in the next phase by 1:3
units, while subjects in the characteristics treatments reduced their contribution
by 13:4 units. Subjects who made the disappointing experience of being sacked,
even though being more cooperative than the partner, considerable reduce their
contribution in the next round when reputation building is impossible, while the
25disappointed in history treatments keep their contributions almost constant, as they
either got matched with a better partner because of their track record or else still
wanted to keep their reputation up. In other words, having been the victim a hit-
and-run strategy leads subjects to reduce their contributions if reputation building
is not possible.
The picture is similar for cases where the subject who was broken up with uni-
laterally contributed less than the partner. There in the history treatment subjects
slightly increased their contribution (+4:8 units) as they wanted to restore some of
their reputation, while the free-riders went on to free-ride even more (￿8:9 units) in
the characteristics treatment.
observation 13 Behaviour changing e⁄ects of re-matching experiences operate
through the case of being broken up with unilaterally. Here the pressure of inform-
ation about past behaviour increases the contributions of free-riders slightly, while
in the absence of information free-riders further decrease their investment. The ex-
perience of being exploited before being broken up with has a negligible impact on
subjects in the history treatment, while it leads to large reductions in contributions
if reputation building is not possible.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper reports on a series of experiments that were designed with the aim to
test if endogenous partnership formation enhances cooperation. Endogenous part-
nership formation was implemented by allowing subjects to break up with their
partners. Re-matching of singles was performed with the help of a stable marriage
mechanism, where unmatched subjects could express their preferences for poten-
tial partners. The underlying social dilemma a partnership faced was a two-player
public goods game. We ￿nd that under certain circumstances endogenous partner-
ship formation can improve welfare. Two factors prove crucial: the possibility of
reputation building and the relative costs and bene￿ts of leaving or remaining in
a partnership. Whenever a partnership is costly to maintain and missing informa-
tion on past behaviour in the pool of potential partners prevents reputation building
then the breakup option does not improve cooperation. There cooperation levels are
even lower than in the case of forced random re-matching with subjects of known
history. In contrast, endogenous partnership formation increases welfare if part-
nerships provide intrinsic value and if information about the contribution history
of potential partners is available when partners are chosen. Cooperation levels are
highest when both these conditions are satis￿ed. Then on average almost 80 percent
of the potential surplus is realised.
The behavioural channels, through which information about the past contribu-
tions of potential partners works are twofold. Firstly, more cooperative subjects
(with a high maximum contribution in an ongoing partnership) are more con￿dent
to ￿nd a better partner and therefore break up more often with non-cooperative
partners. This threat creates an anticipation e⁄ect. Secondly, subjects who have
been broken up with unilaterally modify their behaviour di⁄erently if reputation
pressures are present. Subjects who invested less than their partners try to regain
26some reputation and modestly increase their investment, while subjects, who were
exploited and then dumped, keep their investment roughly constant. In contrast if
history is not observable at the point of re-matching then unilaterally sacked free
riders free-ride even more in the next partnership. The negative reaction is even
stronger for subjects, who were more cooperative than their partners, who broke up
with them. Their disappointment translates into a large reduction of contribution
in the next partnership when reputation pressures are absent. It remains to mention
that self-reported social orientation does not su¢ ce in order to produce these incent-
ives, actual information on past contributions is necessary. Secondly, partnerships
with an intrinsic value lead to higher levels of cooperation than partnerships which
are costly to maintain. Partnerships with intrinsic value are broken up less easily,
which leads to more long-lasting partnerships. Long lasting partnerships are per se
more e¢ cient, as emerging trust and reciprocity keep contributions high.
This study highlights how important reputation mechanisms are. In an envir-
onment, where there is a choice of partners and reputation building is possible, free
riding incentives can be overcome to a large extent. This can explain why online
trading platforms (like Ebay) are extremely successful despite of strong free-riding
incentives. Our results also provide some rationale for the prominence of reference
letters in labour and rental housing markets. For some other areas where partner-
ships play important roles but reputation building is di¢ cult at least separation cost
or an intrinsic value of partnerships might help e¢ ciency. Business partnerships are
often costly to resolve. The same is true for cohabitating partnerships, which also
(should) have some intrinsic value.
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28Appendix A: Sample Instructions 
A1. Treatments with breakup-choice 
 
Before we start, please read the instructions carefully. 
 
D u r i n g  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t ,  y o u r  e a r n i n g s  w i l l  b e  c a l c u l a t e d  i n  p o i n t s  r a t h e r  t h a n  d o l l a r s .  P o i n t s  a r e  
converted to Dollars at the following exchange rate at the end of the session to determine your payment: 
150 Points = AUD 1.00 
You will be paid in cash immediately after the experiment. 
You are not allowed to communicate to other participants during the experiment.  
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and we will attend to you individually.  
Failure to comply with the outlined rules will result in exclusion from the experiment and you will 
forfeit your payment. 
Summary 
 
You will play a game (described in the game section below) for 24 rounds. The game consists of two 
reoccurring tasks. 
Task A: For every round, you will have to decide how to divide 100 points between yourself and an 
investment project. 
Task B: After every four rounds, you will have to make a decision whether you want to stay with your 
partner or break up. 
 
Timeline of the game:
















Task A (every round) 
Task B Task B Task B Task B FinishDetails 
 
Task A :
Task A consists of a game for two people. In what follows we will refer to the person you are playing 
with as your “partner”. In each of the 24 rounds, you have to divide your endowment (100 points) 
between what you keep for yourself and what you invest in the project. Your partner chooses her/his 
investment at the same time. 
The total income you earn will be the sum of two parts:  
(1) Points that you keep (endowment – investment)
(2) Your “income from the project”.  
Income from the project = 0.8 x (your investment + your partner’s investment)
Therefore, your total income is calculated as follows: 
Total income = Points that you keep + income from the project 
= (endowment – investment) + 0.8 x (your investment + your partner’s investment)
Your partner’s income from the project is calculated the same way.   
 
Task B:
After every four rounds, you will have to decide whether you want to continue the game with your 
current partner or break the relationship. This option is also available to your partner. 
If you decide to stay in the relationship, you will receive 10 extra points. 
If either you or your partner decides to break the relationship, the relationship will end and you and 
your partner will be classified as ‘single’. ‘Singles’ are re-matched according to the following 
procedure.  
 Rematching Procedure for ‘singles’: 
• We will display the favourite colour of other ‘singles’ and their hypothetical lottery scenario 
answers (please see attachment at the back). 
• Y ou w il l then be ask ed t o rank  ea ch ‘si ng le’ in pr efe renc e o rde r, i. e. y our m ost fav ouri t e  
candidate should get a ranking of ‘1’.  
• The computer will collect the rankings from every ‘single’ and rematch all ‘singles’ according 
to these rankings. The partner you are matched with is determined by your preferences and the 
preference of all other ‘singles’. The computer is programmed to give you the best partner 
available (according to your ranking). 
 
After everyone has been matched, the experiment will continue for another four rounds. After these 
f o u r  r o u n d s ,  y o u  w i l l  a g a i n  b e  a s k e d  t o  m a k e  a  d e c i s i o n :  s t a y  w i t h  y o u r  p a r t n e r  o r  b r e a k  t h e  
relationship. All the same rules apply as outlined previously. 
This process will continue until 24 rounds have been played. 
After the 24
th round your total profit will be recorded and you will be paid in cash. 
 
A2. Random treatments 
 
Before we start, please read the instructions carefully. 
 
D u r i n g  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t ,  y o u r  e a r n i n g s  w i l l  b e  c a l c u l a t e d  i n  p o i n t s  r a t h e r  t h a n  d o l l a r s .  P o i n t s  a r e  
converted to Dollars at the following exchange rate at the end of the session to determine your payment: 
150 Points = AUD 1.00 
You will be paid in cash immediately after the experiment. 
You are not allowed to communicate to other participants during the experiment.  
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and we will attend to you individually.  
Failure to comply with the outlined rules will result in exclusion from the experiment and you will 
forfeit your payment. 
Summary 
 
You will play a game (described in the game section below) for 24 rounds. 
For every round, you will have to decide how to divide 100 points between yourself and an investment. Timeline of the game:
• You will play this game with a partner. The initial partner is randomly chosen by a computer. 
After every four rounds you will randomly be rematch with a new partner. 
Details 
 
The game consists of a game for two people. In what follows we will refer to the person you are playing 
with as your “partner”. In each of the 24 rounds, you have to divide your endowment (100 points) 
between what you keep for yourself and what you invest in the project. Your partner chooses her/his 
investment at the same time. 
The total income you earn will be the sum of two parts:  
(1) Points that you keep (endowment – investment)
(2) Your “income from the project”.  
Income from the project = 0.8 x (your investment + your partner’s investment)
Therefore, your total income is calculated as follows: 
Total income = Points that you keep + income from the project 
= (endowment – investment) + 0.8 x (your investment + your partner’s investment)
Your partner’s income from the project is calculated the same way.   
After every four rounds, you will randomly be re-matched with a new partner. 
This process will continue until 24 rounds have been played. 
After the 24















  Allocation decision (every round) 
Finish 